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and Return of Orthodoxy

John B. Davis
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Abstract: This paper examines change on the economics research frontier,
and asks whether the current competition between new research programmes
may be supplanted by a new single dominant approach in the future. The
paper discusses whether economics tends to be dominated by a single
approach or reflect a pluralism of approaches, and argues that, historically, it
has alternated between the two. It argues that orthodoxy usually emerges
from heterodoxy, and interprets the division between orthodoxy and
heterodoxy in terms of a core–periphery distinction. Regarding recent
economics, the paper maps out two different types of combinations of new
research programmes as being synchronic or diachronic in nature. It treats
the new research programmes as a new kind of heterodoxy, and asks how a
new orthodoxy might arise out of this new heterodoxy and traditional
heterodoxy. It discusses this question by advancing two views regarding how
to different types of combinations in the new research programmes might
consolidate along the lines of three shared commitments with traditional
heterodoxy to form a new orthodoxy in economics.
Keywords: Recent economics, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, Core–periphery
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1. Introduction
It has recently been argued that mainstream economics is in a
process of transformation driven by the emergence of a collection of
new research programmes over the last two decades all of which make
important departures from standard neoclassical economics (Colander,
2000; Colander et al., 2004; Davis, 2006). These new research
programmes—including classical game theory, evolutionary game
theory, behavioural game theory, evolutionary economics, behavioural
economics, experimental economics, neuroeconomics and agent-based
complexity economics—currently exhibit considerable heterogeneity,
reflecting their separate origins primarily in different sciences outside
economics and their pursuit by relatively distinct communities of
researchers within economics. This development might consequently
be taken as evidence that economics is becoming more pluralistic,
perhaps under the impact of a ‘reverse imperialism’ (Frey and Benz,
2004). But areas of overlap and shared concerns between these new
approaches are becoming increasingly evident, creating the possibility
of a new general research programme for economics that would
abandon much of neoclassicism. Thus, the proliferation of new
approaches in economics may reflect a transitional state of affairs,
which may give way to new orthodoxy and a new mainstream in the
future rather than a more pluralistic economics. This paper
investigates how this new orthodoxy could develop, and how it could
reconstitute the relationship between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in
economics.
This investigation, however, begins with a prior question,
namely, whether economics should even be expected to develop a new
orthodoxy, and thus produce a new division between orthodoxy and
heterodoxy. Why might economics not simply become more pluralistic
for the indefinite future? While my own prescription for economics is
that it ought to become more pluralistic and remain so, here I attempt
to provide a description of the current trend of development in
economics as I see it from the perspective of my reading of the history
of economics. Accordingly Section 2 first argues that economics has
historically tended to alternate between periods in which a single
approach is dominant and periods in which there exist a pluralism of
approaches, and thus that the field recurringly tends to structure itself
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around dominant research programmes, which indeed also tend to
break down, to subsequently be replaced by a pluralism of
approaches, which then in turn give way again to dominant
approaches. In order to lay a basis for examination of the current state
of affairs in the mainstream, the discussion then proceeds to an
analysis of why economics the former phase, or why economics tends
to abandon periods of pluralism to structure itself around dominant
programmes. Section 3 turns to the related issue of the nature of
orthodoxy and heterodoxy in economics. I define these terms, argue
that the relationship between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in economics
is regularly reconstituted across the field's history, and also argue that
orthodoxy usually emerges from heterodoxy. Following these
arguments I represent the relationship between orthodoxy and
heterodoxy in economics as a core–periphery relationship, and then
give a taxonomy of heterodox approaches in terms of their respective
origins and orientations. Section 4 then moves to the current state of
affairs in mainstream economics, and maps out two different types of
combinations of new research programmes characterised as either
synchronic or diachronic in orientation. I argue that all the new
mainstream research programmes maintain fundamental assumptions
strictly at odds with neoclassical orthodoxy and more consonant with
heterodoxy. Section 5 goes on to compare the new research
programmes with traditional heterodox research programmes, and
asks how a new orthodoxy might arise out of heterodoxy in general.
Three shared commitments between the new programmes and
traditional heterodoxy are identified as a potential basis for a new
orthodoxy. Section 6 advances two views—one more conservative and
one more transformational—regarding how the new research
programmes might consolidate around their three shared
commitments with traditional heterodoxy to form a new orthodoxy in
economics. Section 7 closes with brief comments regarding economics'
relative autonomy as a field.

2. Dominance and pluralism in economics
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully review the
relationship between dominant approaches and pluralism in the history
of economics, but consider the nature of five generally accepted
periods of pluralism in economics: the transition from classical to
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neoclassical economics in nineteenth-century Britain (Peart and Levy,
2005); the Methodenstreit between the German Historical School and
the early Austrians (Anderson et al., 1992); the multiple approaches to
labour and monetary economics in post-Marshall Cambridge (Lawlor,
2007); the interwar competition in the USA between institutional and
neoclassical economics (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998); and the 1970s
debate between proponents of monetary and fiscal policy in the ISLM
framework (Young, 1987). In each case we find a that a pluralistic
environment succeeded a period in which a single approach was
dominant, and also find that this pluralistic environment later gave
way to a new dominant approach. Neither pluralism nor dominance,
then, appears to be a permanent state of affairs, and though each
persists for periods of time, each is also ultimately replaced by the
opposite state of affairs. It would be too simple to say that economics
displays anything on the order of regular cycles of pluralism and
dominance over its history, especially given the many interacting
levels on which it (as any other subject) develops, but it might not be
too much to argue that dominant research programmes create
conditions for their subsequent fragmentation, whereas periods of
pluralism create conditions for the re-emergence of new dominant
approaches.1 This does not mean that it is always clear which state of
affairs obtains. Within heterodox economics itself, the current state of
affairs is clearly pluralistic, and yet some have recently argued there
are a number of shared principles and commitments among the
different heterodox approaches that might lay the basis for a single
dominant conception of heterodoxy (Lawson, 2006; Lee, 2006). Within
mainstream economics the situation is less clear, particularly given
current neoclassical dominance of pedagogy, though the research
frontier is clearly more heterogeneous than it was two decades ago,
and debate has now also begun over possible components of a postneoclassical single mainstream approach in economics (Gintis, 2007).2
Beyond the evidence that economics alternates between
dominant approaches and pluralism, why else might we expect periods
of pluralism to be succeeded by periods in which single approaches are
dominant? One way to examine this question is to compare economics
to its immediate neighbours—other social sciences—and here I draw
on an extensive literature from the sociology of scientific knowledge
regarding symbolic boundaries between sciences and academic
disciplines that investigates how different sciences and disciplines rely
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on different systems of internal organisation to promote their relative
autonomy vis-à-vis one another.3 Thus, most social science fields,
such as psychology, sociology, political science, and anthropology, are
basically divided between what is internally seen as the conventional
approach to the field and a collection of unconventional approaches,
and professional legitimation in the field is strongly associated with
pursuing the former. The stronger term ‘orthodox’, although used in
economics, is not commonly associated with conventional approaches
in other fields; nor is the term ‘heterodox’ as common elsewhere. But
the literature as a whole generally argues that academic and
professional disciplines recurringly structure themselves around
dominant approaches on the grounds that this enables individuals
within those fields to organise themselves in coherent (academic or
professional) social groups, which then maintain themselves relative to
similar (academic or professional) social groups that potentially may
lay claim to their research domains.
Why, then, does economics employ the stronger language of
‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy?’ One line of argument in this general
literature emphasises differences between fields' social policy
exposure. In the domain of policy, fields must justify their value to the
non-specialist public, whereas their internal constitution around the
conventional/unconventional divide is a matter of structuring
themselves to maintain their disciplinary boundaries (though the two
defences are related). If we then classify sciences from a policy
perspective as (i) high uncertainty and high stakes, (ii) high
uncertainty and low stakes, (iii) low uncertainty and high stakes and
(iv) low uncertainty and low stakes, because of the wide scope and
profound impact of the market in modern society, and because
economics' policy forecasts are often unreliable at both the micro and
macro levels, economics falls into the first category of high uncertainty
and high stakes. In effect, economics, might be considered an example
of what has been called ‘post-normal’ science (contra Thomas Kuhn),
where considerable uncertainty exists about the consequences of its
policy application, there is weak consensus regarding the science's
underlying values, and the stakes associated with policy error are high
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Ravetz, 1986; also cf. Reay, 2006). My
claim, then, is that one important reason economics uses the language
of ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy’ is that this provides a defence against
the public criticism that is inevitable in high uncertainty, high stakes
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circumstances. Essentially, the orthodoxy–heterodoxy distinction
allows economics to claim economics is scientific by dismissing
heterodoxy as unscientific. This requires that economics institutionalise
visible discriminatory practices against heterodoxy (cf. Lee,
forthcoming), though arguably not eliminate it entirely, since
otherwise the identification of orthodoxy with science is not sustained.
That is, eliminating heterodoxy eliminates orthodoxy. This enables
economics to draw on the general esteem in which science is held in
modern society to limit criticism of failed policy. Moreover, this defence
is indirect in nature—and thus more subtle—because it avoids open
promotion of orthodoxy by emphasising instead the policing of
heterodoxy.4
The need for economics to maintain its status as a science
suggests yet another reason why we should expect periods of
pluralism to be succeeded by periods in which single approaches are
dominant that, in this instance, relies not on comparing economics to
its close neighbours, other social sciences, but on comparing it to the
highly regarded natural and physical sciences. I explain this in terms
of two important respects in which economics differs from the natural
and physical sciences. First, many of the latter employ controlled
experiment to generate laboratory data to evaluate scientific
hypotheses, whereas until quite recently economics has depended
upon less reliable non-experimental field data for the empirical
verification of theory. Second, while all sciences, including the
experimental sciences, are value laden to some degree, valueladeness plays a significantly larger role in economics than it does in
these other sciences by virtue of the closer proximity of economics to
human interests. This latter difference, I suggest, is the more
important one, since many would say that bias, such as that which
value-ladeness can produce, is a worse problem than having to work
with non-experimental field data. Indeed the natural and physical
sciences that use non-experimental data are generally seen as less
vulnerable to bias than economics. The implication of these two points,
accordingly, is that, given the character of its empirical practice,
economics first and foremost needs to minimise the appearance of
value-ladeness to maintain its status as science.
Note, then, that in a pluralistic economics differences in value
assumptions between different approaches are readily apparent,
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making the larger role value judgements play in economics as a whole
more transparent. In contrast, when a dominant programme is in
place, since it tends to be identified with the science as a whole, value
judgements are more likely to be taken for granted and, as a result,
are less frequently articulated. Thus, the main problem associated with
seeing economics as a science vis-à-vis natural and physical science
disappears from view. At the same time, an absence of pluralism also
reduces debate about empirical practice, so that economics'
differences with natural and physical science also attract less
attention. Indeed the issue of economics' standing as a science has
recently become more prominent with the rise of experimental
economics, and repeated pronouncements of experimentalists and
many others that economics' long history as a largely a priori
deductive science exhibits questionable scientific credentials (e.g.
Samuelson, 2005; Smith, 1989, 1994). Thus, altogether pluralism
generates doubts about economics' standing as a science, whereas
dominant approaches tend to reduce these doubts.
For these reasons, then, pluralism in economics tends to give
way to dominant approaches, even if those dominant approaches
ultimately later give way again to pluralism. Consequently, despite an
increasing pluralism on the mainstream economics research frontier,
the subject's history and its relative standing as a scientific discipline
among other disciplines give us good reason to anticipate the
formation of a new dominant approach. It is important to emphasise,
however, that across the history of economics succeeding dominant
approaches have had surprisingly little resemblance to each other.
That is, the dominant approach that follows a period of pluralism
seems to little resemble the dominant approach that preceded that
period of pluralism. For example, classical economics was preceded by
physiocracy and mercantilism, and succeeded by neoclassicism.
Although there exist continuities between all three, most historians
would agree that they represent fundamentally different approaches. I
suggest that in the history of economics, then, the non-replication of
dominant approaches generally holds true. Thus, the possible
emergence of a new dominant approach in mainstream economics is
more likely than not to be substantially different from neoclassical
economics. Two further reasons to expect this are that all the new
research programmes in economics have their origins primarily in
other sciences, and thus import new assumptions and concepts into
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economics, and all challenge fundamental assumptions in
neoclassicism.6 However, before turning to what consolidations
between these new approaches might emerge, the following section
addresses the nature of the orthodox–heterodox divide in current
economics.

3. The orthodox–heterodox divide in economics
The terms ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ have been used in a
variety ways in economics, but in the discussion above they are
treated as sociological terms that define what is generally regarded as
conventional or unconventional in the economics.7 There are two
important implications of this interpretation. First, neither ‘orthodox’
nor ‘heterodox’ inherently refers to any particular type of approach in
economics; alternatively, any kind of approach in economics can be
orthodox or heterodox depending on historical conditions, and indeed
in the history of economics most major approaches have been both at
one time or another, and not infrequently both at the same time,
though in different locations.8 Second, though there has often been a
close correlation between individual economists' professional success
and their association with conventional approaches, this has tended to
be more (though not exclusively) the case when a dominant approach
exists, whereas in periods of pluralism, when what is conventional is
unclear or under challenge, many individuals can be quite successful
professionally though their approaches are still unconventional. For
example, today both behavioural and experimental economics are not
conventional, though many of their main contributors are very
successful professionally, as evidenced by the Nobel prizes awarded to
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith. This creates problems for
explanations of the orthodox–heterodox divide in economics, since the
term ‘mainstream’ is both typically applied to those who are
professionally successful, and is also equated with the term ‘orthodox.’
The professional success of many behavioural and experimental
economists tells us that the first meaning ought to be retained, but the
fact that these approaches are not conventional tells us that the
second meaning should not.
However, this creates a further problem for the interpretation of
the terms ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’, namely, if approaches such as
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behavioural and experimental economics are mainstream yet not
conventional, are they heterodox? Many orthodox and heterodox
economists would no doubt deny they are, because they associate
heterodoxy strictly with being outside the mainstream. Note, however,
that two of the new approaches in the mainstream, behavioural and
evolutionary economics are also established heterodox approaches
and, more recently, heterodox economists have begun to make use of
complexity theory. We might still reserve the term non-conventional
for the new approaches, but I will argue in the next section that the
new approaches all maintain fundamental assumptions at odds with
neoclassical orthodoxy, and thus should be seen as heterodox. This
would then imply that current heterodoxy juxtaposes approaches
many see as quite different, but should this seem an objection, we
might note that in the history of economics heterodoxy has often been
highly heterogeneous. Indeed, historically, heterodoxy in economics
has been more a big tent affair with a variety of disparate approaches
usually having few links to one another rather than having been an
organised opposition to orthodoxy, as is associated with the
contemporary International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism
in Economics (ICAPE). Perhaps the most accurate label, then, is
‘mainstream heterodox’, as odd as this may sound. Some prefer to
emphasise ‘dissent’ as a better label (Backhouse, 2004; Holt and
Pressman, 1998), but dissent suggests disagreement within a shared
framework, and I take the differences between the new approaches in
the mainstream and neoclassicism to be both more radical and indeed
close to many positions that traditional heterodoxy has critically
advanced against neoclassicism. The next section thus provides a
defence of the ‘mainstream heterodox’ label in terms of these
positions, and then Section 5 turns to the issue of what this all implies
about the relationship between existing heterodoxy and mainstream
heterodoxy.
Returning, however, to the historical relationship between
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, I claim that orthodoxy ultimately always
emerges from heterodoxy (cf. Coats, 1999). New dominant
approaches emerge from periods of pluralism that are preceded by
periods with earlier orthodox–heterodox divides. As dominant
approaches have not historically replicated themselves across periods
of pluralism, new dominant approaches must have their origins in
heterodoxy. How, then, might current heterodoxy produce a future
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orthodoxy? To investigate this question, the balance of this section
distinguishes between different heterodox approaches in terms of their
different origins and orientations, and frames this all in terms of a
core–periphery characterisation of the orthodox–heterodox divide.
As befits the postwar period of neoclassical dominance, much
thinking about existing heterodoxy is strongly associated with
understanding its relation to neoclassicism, and this common
opposition suggests that these different approaches have similar
origins and orientations. But just as the history of economics shows
that orthodoxy arises in different ways, it also shows that different
approaches become heterodox in different ways. Further, as some
heterodox approaches ultimately become orthodox and others do not,
their respective orientations toward orthodoxy should be expected to
differ as well. Focusing first on the origins side of the story, I
distinguish four different ways in which heterodox approaches arise
relative to changes in orthodoxy. Heterodoxy arises because of:That
is, different heterodox research programmes have what might be
called different ‘origin stories’, where these stories tell how particular
research programmes acquire the status of being heterodox. Though
there is considerable room for debate, among the approaches
customarily seen to be heterodox I provisionally suggest that the
Veblenian evolutionary–institutional approach be seen as an example
of (1), post-Keynesianism as the inheritor of J. M. Keynes' economics
be seen as an example of (2), the neo-Ricardian approach as reflects
Piero Sraffa's thinking be seen as an example of (3), and early feminist
economics that engaged the work of Gary Becker be seen as an
example of (4).9
(1) Failure to become orthodox following a period of pluralism.
(2) Loss of the status of orthodox when a new orthodoxy
emerges.
(3) Failure to redirect orthodoxy from outside orthodoxy.
(4) Failure to redirect orthodoxy from inside orthodoxy.
To place these origin stories in a larger framework, let us represent
the relationship between orthodox and heterodox approaches in
economics as a core–periphery relationship, where the field's core
principles and concepts are defined as orthodox and also suppress
reference to periphery principles, while the field's heterodox periphery
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is defined in terms of principles and concepts explicitly seen to lie
outside the core and yet which also bear some relationship to the
boundaries of the field as a whole. For example, a core principle in
orthodox neoclassical economics is that individual behaviour is
rational, and a common defense of the principle is that ‘it could not be
otherwise’ (thus suppressing reference to other forms of
conceptualisation). In contrast, a periphery principle in traditional
Marxist economics is that individual behaviour reflects class location.
The Marxist explanation is heterodox in virtue of explicitly lying outside
the core of the field, but the concept of class also bears a relation to
the boundaries of economics in light of its important role in sociology.
Two comments on this framework are worth noting. First, though the
core–periphery distinction can be used to distinguish orthodoxy and
heterodoxy, since nothing in the history of economics is intrinsically
orthodox or heterodox, core and periphery principles and concepts can
and have exchanged places in the history of economics. Second, it can
also be argued that, as the sciences are relatively distinct from one
another, over often considerable periods of time, certain principles
tend to remain core principles across changes in dominant approaches,
even when these arise out of heterodoxy (despite considerable change
regarding what else is orthodox). For example, it might be argued that
the concept of equilibrium is a core principle in economics, and that
challenges to this principle risk breaking down the boundaries of
economics as a relatively autonomous discipline. I return to this point
briefly in the last section.
In addition to different heterodox approaches' origin stories, then,
consider now their different possible orientations. Whereas orthodox
approaches are essentially inward-looking, and generally suppress
reference to heterodox programmes within their own conceptualisation
(if not in their self-defence as science), heterodox approaches can
orient more or less toward the field's core or toward the boundaries of
economics and other sciences beyond its periphery. Combining these
two orientation possibilities with the four different origin stories gives a
roughly eight-fold classification of heterodox approaches. Again, of
course, classifying any particular individual heterodox approach as one
of these eight cases cannot but be controversial. And individual
heterodox approaches also exhibit considerable heterogeneity allowing
multiple interpretations. As illustrations, however, I suggest examples
of two polar cases.
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One extreme is an approach that originates as orthodox, but upon
becoming heterodox—origin story (2)—turns away from the new
orthodoxy to incorporate principles from other sciences, thus, in effect,
continually moving from the centre outwards. Post-Keynesian
economics, for example, might be considered formerly orthodox (as
Keynes's economics before ISLM) and is now heterodox, but, as
fundamentally concerned with path-dependency and strong
uncertainty, concepts with currently a greater role outside of
economics in evolutionary biology and history, could be characterised
as oriented outwards toward the boundaries of economics. Or, to take
the opposite extreme, there are what I regard as heterodox
approaches in economics that originate in other sciences, that is,
beyond the field's periphery, and then orient inwards toward the core
of economics in an attempt to redirect it, though remaining heterodox
unless successful—origin story (3). Current behavioural economics
with its origins in psychology and its primary focus as the critique of
rational choice has an orientation toward the core of economics and
thus seems to be an example of this case.
Whether these classifications are accepted or rejected, I argue that
different heterodox approaches can generally be distinguished and
characterised according to their respective combinations of different
origin stories and primary orientations. What, then, does this imply
about current heterodoxy, broadly understood? I claim that all the new
mainstream research programmes in economics (evolutionary
economics may be an exception) are generally, like behavioural
economics, examples of the second extreme above. They all originate
outside of economics and are mostly oriented toward redirecting the
core of economics. That is, their agenda is to revise the existing core
principles in the discipline. The situation is more mixed, however, with
those approaches usually recognised as heterodox. Some are oriented
toward the field's core, but most, I believe, are oriented more towards
the field's boundaries, with the project of broadening or transforming
economics as a whole by challenging its boundaries. Consider, for
example, the theory of choice as a core doctrine. Behavioural
economists think the theory of choice in economics is wrong, but
rather than abandon the theory of choice altogether, they want to
revise it. Most heterodox economists, however, simply believe the
theory of choice should be abandoned for non-individualistic
conceptualisations of the economic process that have more in common
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with other social sciences. My point here is not that one approach is
better or worse than the other, but that the orientations are different,
and this may have significant implications for how economics changes
in the future, and a new orthodoxy (and heterodoxy) develops.

4. Synchronic and diachronic research
programmes in recent mainstream economics
I treat the new research programmes in mainstream economics
as largely synchronic or diachronic. Synchronic types of explanations
can be defined as those that emphasise the interrelation of particular
kinds of phenomena within limited time frames, and diachronic types
of explanations can be defined as those that emphasise how
phenomena undergo a process of change through time. I do not refer
to these two types of explanations as static and dynamic for three
reasons. First, to do so would be to assume that these new
programmes replicate that same distinction, whereas the history of
economics appears to show that this distinction applies specifically to
the period in which neoclassical economics is dominant rather than
across the history of economics. Second, standard static explanations
are general explanations of abstract agents framed mathematically,
whereas those approaches I treat as synchronic are ideal-type
scenario-driven accounts of particular processes governing the
interaction of interdependent agents explicated with a variety of
modelling strategies. Similarly, the standard view of dynamics is that it
involves investigation of mathematical models that are recursive and
deterministic, while the approaches I treat as diachronic explicitly
model evolution and change. Third, the static–dynamic distinction does
not align nicely with the synchronic–diachronic distinction. For
example, game theory, which might be thought of as a
characteristically static form of explanation, has one-off games, finitely
repeated games, indefinitely repeated games and evolutionary games
(cf. Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2004), whereas agent-based
complexity economics, which might be thought of as a
characteristically dynamic form of explanation, is populated with
simulation models that set up initial conditions that are allowed to run
out to sets of determinate (if often unexpected) results (e.g. Kirman,
2001; Tesfatsion, 2001). Indeed, my view is that the synchronic–
diachronic distinction, while reasonably adequate as a means of
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classifying the new research programmes today, will stand up less well
as these programmes increasingly converge and draw upon one
another in the future.
The research programmes employing primarily synchronic forms
of explanation (and some leading figures), then, are classical game
theory (John Nash, Robert Aumann, John Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten
and Ariel Rubinstein), behavioural game theory (Colin Camerer, Ernst
Fehr, Werner Guth and Matthew Rabin), behavioural economics
(Herbert Simon, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Thaler,
George Loewenstein, Colin Camerer, Jon Elster and Gerd Gigerenzer),
experimental economics (Vernon Smith, Selten, David Grether,
Charles Plott) and neuroeconomics (Paul Glimcher, Colin Camerer, Paul
Zak and Kevin McCabe). The research programmes employing
primarily diachronic forms of explanation (and some leading figures)
are evolutionary game theory (Thomas Schelling, Robert Axelrod, John
Maynard Smith, Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson), evolutionary
economics (Paul David, H. Peyton Young and Douglas North) and
agent-based complexity economics (Herbert Simon, Thomas Schelling,
John Holland, Brian Arthur, Douglas North, Steve Durlauf, Alan
Kirman, Paul Krugman and Leigh Tesfatsion).
Note that some of these ‘new’ programmes had antecedents in
the postwar period that failed to command a significant following, for
example, game theory immediately after the war (cf. Mirowski, 2002)
and the behavioural economics of Simon and colleagues (cf. Sent,
2004). In addition, some of the individuals mentioned above were
active in these new approaches well before they became recognised in
the last two decades as identifiable research programmes (e.g. the
earlier work of Smith and Schelling). Also, note that the boundaries
between the approaches are not always sharp, as reflected in some
individuals' involvement in more than one approach. Finally, although
these approaches are all new to the mainstream, in varying degrees
they all have antecedents in existing heterodox research programmes,
which in some instances go back many years. Indeed, this link,
generally unacknowledged from both sides, is central to the argument
of this paper.
Three of the synchronic programmes, then, classical game
theory, experimental economics and behavioural game theory, are
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accounts of agent interaction, whereas two others, behavioural
economics per se and neuroeconomics, provide theoretical and
empirical foundations for these accounts. All investigate different types
of ideal-type scenarios, basically different kinds of games or different
auction forms or trading systems (cf. Friedman and Cassar, 2004;
Heinrich et al., 2004), in which individuals interact in particular
contexts rather than simply solve general parameterised Walrasian
optimisation problems (cf. Colander, 1996). Individuals may be selfregarding, other-regarding (Gintis, 2007) and act on the basis of a
variety of norms, ethical and otherwise, which may have social or
anthropological bases (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). They exhibit a
variety of types of behaviour other than optimisation, are boundedly
rational and weak of will in various ways, and have preferences that
are endogenous in varying degrees, the main debate being whether
preferences are constructed (Cubitt et al., 2001) or discovered (Plott,
1996), not whether preferences are exogenous. There is considerable
ambivalence and outright doubts about laissez faire and the idea that
markets are natural with interventionist calls for ‘libertarian
paternalism’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003), and the issue of how to
construct markets or market design has moved to the forefront of
policy (cf. Guala, 2001; Nik-Khah, 2006).
Behavioural economics (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003;
Kahneman, 2003; Starmer, 2000) and neuroeconomics (Camerer et
al., 2005) offer theories of the foundations of agent behaviour. In
both, the axiomatic rationality analysis of neoclassicism is rejected, in
the former in light of evidence from psychology and in the latter in
light of evidence from neuroscience. Relatedly, though classical game
theory treats individuals as rational, the rather mixed success of the
equilibrium refinements programme meant to limit the possible Nash
equilibria in games (cf. Rizvi, 1994) casts doubt on the degree to
which individuals in games can indeed be seen as rational. In contrast,
behavioural game theory, arguably now the main avenue forward for
game theory, investigates individual behaviour in games empirically
rather than simply assume it to be rational (Camerer, 2003). Game
theory in general, moreover, rejects neoclassicism's benchmark
competitive model of indirect interaction solely through the price
mechanism to focus on scenario-driven direct interaction.
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In terms of the core–periphery analysis of orthodox and
heterodox from the last section, then, these approaches all exhibit
both origin story (3), by virtue of the fact that their concepts,
principles and theoretical strategies originate in other sciences, and as
described above are also all oriented inward, by virtue of their focus on
challenging core neoclassical assumptions and commitments.
Experimentalism, of course, did not exist in economics, except in rare
instances, until relatively recently and, by its nature, it contests the a
priori form of theorizing characteristic of neoclassicism.
Experimentalism, however, is fundamental in most other sciences.
Behavioural economics and neuroeconomics, as noted, originate in
psychology and neuroscience, respectively. Game theory was
developed initially in mathematics, and intentionally exported to
economics for the purpose of transforming it (von Neumann and
Morgenstern, 1944). Combined, these different programmes offer an
alternative substantive account of individual behaviour as interactive
as well as alternative methodologies and methods of investigation.
The new synchronic approaches, then, all maintain fundamental
assumptions at odds with neoclassical orthodoxy. What about the
diachronic programmes? The three diachronic forms of explanation—
evolutionary game theory, evolutionary economics and agent-based
complexity economics—have even less in common with neoclassicism.
Most importantly, whereas the latter employs dynamic models with
given agents on deterministic time paths, the new programmes use a
biology-based type of modelling with evolving environments in which
agents and their relationships change. Evolutionary game theory, the
most mathematical (thus perhaps thought the closest to
neoclassicism), abandons individuals and methodological individualism
altogether to focus on population shares of types of agents or kinds of
strategies (cf. Samuelson, 2002). As in classical game theory, agents
interact directly in specific contexts, but their interaction can be
transformed by the emergence of unforeseeable strategies and
‘mutant’ agents. In non-game theoretic evolutionary approaches,
institutional structures condition and are generated by lock-in, network
externalities and path dependence (David, 1985, 2005; North, 2004).
Complexity approaches employ bounded rationality and coevolving
expectations of heterogeneous agents to explore different systems of
agent interaction (Arthur et al., 1997). All of this is incompatible with
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the neoclassical static conception of atomistic individuals with
exogenous preferences.
These diachronic approaches also exhibit origin story (3),
particularly in light of the strong influence of biological reasoning and,
in the case of complexity approaches, additional influences from
physical science and cognitive science (Clark, 1997; Holland, 1995).
Essentially these programmes all have their origins outside of
economics. The situation with respect to orientation, however, is not
as clear as it is with respect to the new synchronic research
programmes. While the intention to substitute direct interaction for
indirect Walrasian interaction and general recourse to bounded choice
indicates a focus on changing economics' core, evolutionary reasoning
itself has little basis in neoclassicism,10 and thus arguably these
diachronic programmes are more concerned with expanding the
boundaries of economics and are thus oriented toward the periphery of
economics. I return to this issue below, in Section 6, where I address
two possible scenarios for the consolidation of economics around a
new orthodoxy. But in Section 5 I first discuss the relationship
between the new mainstream heterodoxy and traditional heterodoxy.

5. Mainstream heterodoxy and traditional
heterodoxy
The general argument advanced here is that orthodoxy emerges
from heterodoxy. But this includes the possibility that a future
orthodoxy in economics might emerge from a combination of
heterodox approaches, thus inviting us to address the relationship
between the new mainstream heterodoxy and traditional heterodoxy.
The main traditional heterodox programmes are generally said to be:
(old) institutional economics, Marxist economics (and radical
economics), post-Keynesian economics, neo-Ricardian economics,
social economics and socio-economics, Austrian economics, feminist
economics, critical realism, and post-modernist economics.11 In terms
of the sociology of economics, there seem to be five important
differences between these and other traditional heterodox groups and
the new mainstream approaches.

Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol 32, No. 3 (May 2008): pg. 349-366. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Oxford University Press.

17

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

One difference between them is that the traditional programmes
have become heterodox in different ways or have different origin
stories, while the new programmes are all heterodox in virtue of their
recent emergence in economics from locations outside the field. A
second difference is that many of the former tend to be oriented
toward the periphery of economics as reflected in a rejection of core
orthodox principles rather than pursuit of their reform, combined with
an advocacy of alternative foundations for economics based on closer
ties to, and less sharp boundaries with, sociology, history, politics and
anthropology. There are important exceptions to this judgement (for
example, neo-Ricardian economics), but I believe it is shared by most
of the recent commentators on traditional heterodoxy (e.g. Backhouse,
2000; Dow, 2000; Lawson, 2006; Lee, 2006). A third difference, as
noted above, is that mainstream heterodoxy enjoys the professional
advantages of the mainstream. A fourth difference concerns attitudes
toward dominance and pluralism in economics. Whereas most
traditional heterodox economists reject the idea that economics should
have a dominant programme, and embrace the idea that economics
should be pluralistic,12 most mainstream heterodox economists—as
reflects their mainstream professional location and their orientation on
the field's core—accept the idea that economics tends to be dominated
by single approaches. A fifth difference concerns attitudes toward
methods and methodological practice, specifically formal modelling and
positivism. Indeed, while some see this as a fundamental dividing line
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy (e.g., Backhouse, 2000; Lawson,
1997), most individuals in the new mainstream approaches see the
issue as a matter of which more or less formal methods are best
rather than whether such methods play too large a role in economics.
Given these differences, if sociological factors were to prevail,
prima facie it seems more likely that future orthodoxy in economics
will result from a combination of the new mainstream research
programmes rather than a combination of those and traditional
heterodox approaches (much less the latter alone). Reinforcing this
conclusion is the very limited communication between proponents of
the new and traditional heterodox research programmes (though
recently there have been links from both sides between those
favouring behavioural, complexity and evolutionary approaches).
Despite this, we might also place weight on the fact that the new
mainstream approaches reject many of the fundamental doctrinal
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assumptions of neoclassicism, and ask whether possible agreement
over the content of economics might generate greater congruence
between the new and traditional heterodox research programmes than
sociological factors suggest. To investigate this possibility, I identify
three substantive principles, which I suggest characterise the main
concerns of most of traditional heterodoxy and constitute critiques of
neoclassicism (cf. Davis, 2007), and ask what roles they play in the
new mainstream approaches. These three principles are:Each of these
principles operates in the new mainstream approaches taken as a set,
but, it should be emphasised, each does not operate in each and every
one of those approaches. Thus, whether an alignment between the
new approaches and traditional heterodoxy may possibly emerge in
the future to produce a new orthodoxy in economics seems to depend
in good part on how these principles come to be embraced across the
new mainstream heterodoxy as a whole. I turn, then, to two possible
pathways by which this might occur.
1. Individuals are socially embedded rather than atomistic.
2. Processes are evolutionary rather than mechanical.
3. Individuals and social-economic structures are mutually
influencing.

6. Two pathways to a new orthodoxy
Distinguishing the synchronic and diachronic research
programmes, the five synchronic research programmes appear to be
primarily concerned with the first and third issues above, whereas the
three diachronic research programmes appear to be primarily
concerned with the second and third issues. Regarding the shared
third issue, while it is not difficult to see that diachronic approaches
emphasising evolution and change have as a fundamental assumption
that individuals and social-economic structures are mutually
influencing, perhaps it is less obvious with respect to the synchronic
approaches. But to take the two 2002 Nobel prize winners as
representative, the idea is indeed fundamental to the Kahneman's
bounded rationality framing argument in the simple idea that context
influences choice (Kahneman, 2003) and to experimentalist Vernon
Smith's ‘environment–institutions–behaviour’ triad and slogan that
‘institutions matter’ (Smith, 1989). Indeed both behaviouralists and
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experimentalists generally accept the idea of a two-way street
between individual behaviour and social-economic structures, and
have recently found further common ground in behavioural game
theory's cross-cultural experimental examination of how social rules
and choices in different societies interact (Heinrich et al., 2004). It is
not to be denied that, in comparison with traditional heterodoxy, this
principle operates in a more formal and positivistic manner. But it is
important to recognise that the substantive position itself is the same
as that in traditional heterodoxy. Or, to put matters critically, both the
new mainstream approaches and traditional heterodoxy reject the
neoclassical one-way street microfoundations view.
While the three diachronic programmes are primarily concerned
with the second and third issues, they hardly regard individuals as
atomistic, as reflected in the idea that individuals and social structures
are mutually influencing. But the status of individuals seems to be a
secondary focus in these programmes, with greater attention being
devoted to the interaction of different kinds of agents in evolutionary
processes.13 Thus, the two kinds of new mainstream approaches
specialize, as it were, on the first and second principles above, while
sharing the third. That is, synchronic approaches take individuals to be
socially embedded rather than atomistic, and largely ignore the issue
of whether economic processes are evolutionary, while diachronic
approaches do the reverse.
On the basis of this difference, I map out two pathways—one
more conservative and one more transformational—regarding how a
new future orthodoxy might arise in economics. The two pathways are
differentiated according to the degree of departure they make from
current neoclassical orthodoxy. The main difference between them
concerns the weight given to the new diachronic programmes'
specialisation and primary concern with processes of change. Current
neoclassical orthodoxy exhibits almost no concern with genuine
processes of change. A new conservative orthodoxy, then, would
essentially emphasise the two commitments of the synchronic
programmes, and de-emphasise the primary commitment of the
diachronic programmes. On the other hand, a new transformational
orthodoxy would combine all three commitments and make a more
significant departure from neoclassicism in seeing the economic
process as evolutionary. Further, on the transformational pathway, the
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combination of all three commitments in a single programme would
presumably produce a stronger interpretation of the two principles
specific to the synchronic programmes.
Specifically, consider the kinds of commitments a new
orthodoxy might make to principles one and three on the more
conservative view. Regarding the first principle, while individuals
could, in principle, still be seen to be ‘socially’ embedded, this would
be true in only the most abstract sense were it not framed by some
account of how individuals' social embeddedness reflected a changing
economic environment. For example, behavioural economics treats
individuals as ‘socially’ embedded rather than atomistic via its
heuristics of choice critique of standard theory's independence axiom,
but this only takes us as far as the simple idea that the context of
choice matters. Regarding the third principle, individuals and socialeconomic structures can still be seen to be mutually influencing, but
the idea of social-economic structures could again be highly abstract
and formal. For example, the commitment that the experimental
economics of Vernon Smith and others makes to the mutual influence
idea—‘institutions matter’—essentially compares the designs of
different alternative market institutions in their effects on choice from
the perspective of the expert, and tells us little about how the two-way
street relationship between institutions and individuals actually works
in an historical world governed by change.14
A new orthodoxy, then, could distinguish itself from neoclassical
orthodoxy by its mild adoption of principles one and three and general
neglect of principle two, and thus remain conservative in terms of the
limited departure this would make from the current standard view. It
could then be argued that this limited departure a new synchronicbased orthodoxy would make from neoclassicism does not
substantially change the nature of economics (though it would involve
a genuine departure from neoclassical rational choice microfoundations
thinking), since economics would still be largely about choice, albeit as
set out in a collection of ideal-type interactive contexts. One might
hope that the continual introduction of new concepts in experimental
and behavioural game theory increasingly at odds with old neoclassical
ones (e.g. various concepts of cognitive processing) might put the
process of change in economics on a slippery slope leading to a future
economics of interactive individual behaviour quite different in nature,
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but it seems more reasonable to say that the only guarantee that this
would occur lies in there being some explicit commitment to
evolutionary theorising.
How, then, are we to understand what emerges as heterodoxy
on these two views? On the more conservative view, heterodoxy is
occupied by neoclassicism, the new diachronic approaches and those
traditional heterodox approaches most associated with evolutionary
reasoning. On the transformational view, heterodoxy is occupied by
neoclassicism, not by the new diachronic approaches nor by any of the
traditional heterodox approaches. Indeed, on the transformational
view, all three dividing lines between current orthodoxy and
heterodoxy are erased, leaving neoclassicism alone in the periphery of
economics. This is certainly not to say that differences would not
remain between the new research programmes and traditional
heterodoxy, particularly with respect to formalism and positivism. But
I suggest that these differences would rather be grounds for dissent
and disagreement within a new orthodoxy. They could, however, still
produce inequities in professional advantages.
The interesting question remaining, consequently, concerns
whether traditional heterodoxy might influence the process of change
in economics, particularly whether the future pathway is conservative
or transformational. Two considerations seem relevant. First, most
traditional heterodox economists deny they share any common ground
with the new research approaches in economics. Indeed, if one
surveys what is published in most traditional heterodox journals, there
seems to be limited interest, familiarity and understanding of what
these new approaches involve. This stance, on the surface, would
seem to make the conservative pathway more likely. Against this,
more recently a not insignificant number of heterodox economists
have become knowledgeable and interested in the new programmes,
especially the diachronic ones, where evolutionary and complexity
reasoning draw on traditional heterodox commitments, but also in the
behavioural and experimental programmes, as they connect to a longstanding interest in bounded rationality. Second, many traditional
heterodox approaches, I believe it can be argued, have adopted an
orientation toward the periphery of economics on the grounds that
economics needs to be changed through adoption of concepts and
principles from other disciplines and social sciences. While I am
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strongly sympathetic to this view of the need for a far-reaching
transformation of economics, if these are not the grounds on which
economics is in fact changing, then this stance would also make the
conservative pathway more likely.
What does this all recommend, then, to traditional heterodox
economists? If the argument above is correct regarding the three
principles as the common ground of current heterodoxy, then
traditional heterodox economists should actively engage with research
in the new programmes where its implications advances these
principles. This, of course, does not mean supporting everything in the
new programmes (indeed old neoclassical commitments and training
still influence the new research, if decreasingly so) and, furthermore,
the new programmes certainly ignore many important concerns in
traditional heterodoxy, so that emphasis needs always to lie on shared
ground. But if engagement with the new programmes on this basis is
possible, then perhaps it would help make these principles more
explicit and central to those programmes. Moreover, since on the
transformational view of the future of economics the new diachronic
programmes play a key role in contesting neoclassicism, engagement
with these programmes in particular offers an important opportunity to
increase their relative influence. Traditional heterodoxy, then, seems
to have important cards to play.

7. Economics as a separate science
Economics has long seen itself since itself as a relatively
autonomous science with its own distinctive set of characteristics that
make it a ‘separate’ science (Hausman, 1992). But given that all the
new programmes on the research frontier have their origins in other
sciences, and import new conceptual contents from outside economics
into the field, the status of economics' boundaries and separateness
from other fields has become a very real issue. At the same time,
economics, as other sciences, has regularly imported other science
contents in the past, and having subsequently ‘domesticated’ them,
remade itself still as economics. In the current situation, for example,
behavioural economics—a research programme in economics, not in
psychology—employs imports from psychology but frames them in
terms of economic concerns. Thus, though, historically, sciences do
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sometimes largely pass out of existence, nonetheless there seems to
be considerable stability in the long term array of the different
sciences (augmented by the rise of new ones) giving us reason to
rather believe that from time to time they remodel themselves at least
in some degree in the image of other sciences while sustaining their
relatively distinctive concerns. If economics, then, remade itself in the
image of physics at the turn of the last century (Mirowski, 1989), it
may now be remaking itself at the turn of this one in the image of
psychology and biology, as reflected in the impetus these fields,
respectively, give to the new synchronic and diachronic programmes in
economics.
Such a change could be profound and far-reaching, as casual
reflection on the difference between modelling social science
relationships on physical ones versus natural ones readily suggests. In
the current short term, however, this still leaves open what economics'
distinctive concerns and indeed its own definition might come to be.
Thus, those traditional heterodox research programmes oriented
towards economics' boundaries rather than towards its core seem to
have one special advantage in a time when the influence of other
sciences on economics is strong, since they tend to focus on issues
concerning the nature of the field as a whole, which can be neglected
by those programmes more dedicated to working out the details of the
critique of core orthodoxy. This suggests that a future orthodoxy
emergent from current heterodoxy may draw differentially from
heterodox research programmes of different orientations based on a
division of labour between them. But as the engagement between the
new research programmes and traditional heterodox programmes is
still quite limited, I leave these issues to future consideration.
The author is also grateful to those attending presentations of
the paper at the 2006 History of Economics Society Annual Meeting,
the 2007 International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in
Economics Conference, and the 2007 History of Recent Economics
Conference.
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I do not investigate the fragmentation of dominant approaches and te
rise of pluralism here, because my focus is on possible
convergences in the new research approaches in economics.
However, three perhaps complementary theories about why the
postwar dominance of the neoclassical research programme has
generated conditions for the rise of the new research
programmes in economics are summarised in Davis (2006).
2
This paper was widely circulated before publication, and is published
with a collection of commentaries.
3
Though the sociological concept of symbolic boundaries dates back to
the nineteenth century, its application in research on the nature
of academic disciplines and the professions dates from the
1980s and in-group versus out-group social identity analysis as
developed by Tajfel and Turner (1971). Lamont and Molnár
(2002) provide a recent, comprehensive survey of this
literature. Influential contributions include those of Abbott
(1988), Bourdieu (1988), Bowker and Starr (1999), Collins
(1998), and especially (Gieryn 1983, 1993, 1999).
4
An alternative, more enlightened, direct form of defence of economic
policy would be for economics to join other sciences and
disciplines in adopting a professional code of ethics (DeMartino,
2005).
6
For example, all appear to work with alternatives to the atomistic
individual conception, a foundational assumption in neoclassical
economics (cf. Davis, 2008).
7
Here I largely agree with Colander (2003A, 2003B).
8
Thus from 1950 to 1990 neoclassical economics was orthodox in
capitalist economies and heterodox in socialist economies, while
Marxist economics was orthodox in socialist economies and
heterodox in capitalist economies.
9
See Davis and Sent (2006) for fuller discussion of heterodox origin
stories.
10
There is a Chicago School tradition in evolutionary thinking, but its
focus is on an ‘as if’ justification of rational behaviour in the
form of an outcome of a past evolutionary process, whereas the
1
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new evolutionary programmes are focused on evolutionary
systems themselves.
11
See the ICAPE associates (www.icape.org) for a much longer list.
12
See the charter of the International Confederation of Associations for
Pluralism in Economics (www.icape.org). All eight traditional
approaches identified above are represented in ICAPE. Many
post-Keynesians and neo-Ricardians, however, accept the
dominance view.
13
Tesfatsion, for example, asserts that the term agent 'refers broadly
to bundled data and behavioural methods representing an entity
constituting part of a computationally constructed world.
Examples of possible agents include individuals (e.g. consumers,
workers), social groupings (e.g. families, firms, government
agencies), institutions (e.g. markets, regulatory systems),
biological entities (e.g. crops livestock, forests) and physical
entities (e.g. infrastructure, weather, geographical regions)
(Tesfatsion, 2005, p. 6).
14
Indeed, Smith largely packs evolutionary arguments into the past by
employing arguments from evolutionary psychology to explain
individuals' current choice behaviour as an outcome of evolution
rather than part of an on-going evolutionary process (Smith,
2003).
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